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 On the face of it, there is no cultural practice that demands international 
paternalism more than female genital mutilation/ cutting (FGM/ C). 1 
It seems a paradigm case of “hard paternalism” where intervention 
is justifi ed regardless of the wishes of those undergoing the cutting 
and those carrying it out. 2 In other words, for all but the most hard-
ened cultural relativists, the practice of cutting the clitorises off pre- 
pubescent girls in their millions is indefensible. FGM/ C trespasses 
on several deeply held norms treasured by liberals, stimulating the 
urge to protect the autonomy and integrity of the innocent person 
threatened by actions deemed barbaric (i.e., based in ignorance 
and tradition) and therefore the antithesis of the enlightened mod-
ern. R ecall Gerald Dworkin’s infl uential defi nition of paternalism, 
“interference with a person’s liberty of action justifi ed by reasons 
referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests 
or values of the person being coerce d.” 3 Could there be a better test 
case for this sort of paternalism than FGM/ C, especially because 
children are its victims? Th e quintessential nineteenth- century lib-
eral, John Stuart Mill, acknowledged three exceptions to the restric-
tion on interfering with people’s liberty: preventing harm to others, 
the protection of children, and what he called “backward states of 
socie ty.” 4 For many abolitionists, FGM/ C brings all three of these 
exceptions togethe r. 
 Bu t things immediately become more complicated. For a start, inter-
vention in most cases is a three- way relationship: intervener, mother, 
 1  I discuss the politics of this term later. I mainly use FGM/ C except when 
referring to the practice’s most vocal opponents for whom only the acronym 
“FGM” will do. 
 2  Joel  Feinberg ,  Harm to Self: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law ( New York : 
 Oxford University Press ,  1986 ),  12 . 
 3  Gerard  Dworkin , “ Paternalism ,”  The Monist  56 ,  1 ( 1972 ):  65 . 
 4  John Stuart Mill,  On Liberty (A Public Domain Book), 7, 39. Also Dworkin, 
“Paternalism,” 76. 
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child. Children are not only the classic targets of paternalistic action, 
their interests are the grounds for the claims to rightful authority of 
 both interveners and parents. 5 We have, in other words, two compet-
ing claimants to the title “legitimate paternalist.” The child does not 
get to defi ne what her interests are; as with any child, her life up to this 
point has been one act of paternalism after another. She is already self 
molded by paternalistic acts – parental and social choices (embedded 
in socio- cultural norms) made for her on the basis that it’s “for her own 
good.” Now anti- FGM/ C activists arrive to trump parental authority 
in time to prevent an irrevocable act of what’s seen as wrongful pater-
nalism, modifying or removing the child’s genitalia, taking pla ce. 
 To stop FGM/ C these external interveners insert their judgment in 
place of the judgment of the girl’s family, in particular her mother. 6 
Because we are dealing with a child, the girl’s consent (or lack of it) has 
little social, legal, or moral force. 7 Others compete to defi ne and realize 
her interests. Gi ven that the dividing line between “hard” and “soft” 
paternalism is largely about consent (in hard paternalism, whether or 
not you consented to be circumcised would not matter), and that par-
ents have rightful authority over their daughters and in the majority of 
active cases continue to circumcise, why does their “consent” (that is, 
their paternalistic choice for their daughter) lack forc e? In the case of 
FGM/ C, international paternalism overrules parental paternalism on 
the basis that cutting daughters is considered “presumptively wrong” 
because such acts “invasively interfere by transgressing independently 
specifi able moral principles e.g., it is presumptively wrong to kill, 
coerce, deceive and so on.” 8 In short, FGM/ C is considered both mor-
ally wrong in and of itself as well as being against the “real interests” 
 5  Dworkin defi nes as “impure paternalism” situations (“two- party cases”) where 
those whose liberty is being constrained (in this case mothers and midwives 
who circumcise) differs from those who will benefi t: “Paternalism,” 68. Joel 
Feinberg prefers the term “indirect” to impure;  Harm to Self , 9– 10. 
 6  For a discussion of authority including the idea of surrendering one’s 
judgement, see  Joseph  Raz ,  The Morality of Freedom ( Oxford :  Clarendon 
Press ,  1988 ), chs. 3 and 4, and  Seana Valentine  Schiffrin , “ Paternalism, 
Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation ,”  Philosophy and Public 
Affairs  29 ( 2000 ). 
 7  See  Francis  Schrag , “ The Child in the Moral Order ,”  Philosophy  52 ,  200 
( 1977 ). 
 8  Donald  VanDeVeer ,  Paternalistic Intervention: The Moral Bounds on 
Benevolence ( Princeton :  Princeton University Press ,  1986 ),  21 . 
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of the child (as per Dworkin’s defi nition above). In such a case, paren-
tal paternalism (“consent” to FGM/ C) carries no weight and hard 
international paternalism is justifi ed, for advocates, in trumping it. As 
we will see, this marks the anti- FGM strand of the global anti- FGM/ 
C moveme nt. 
 S of t paternalism differs from hard paternalism in that it “permits 
interference only in the absence of voluntariness or genuine con-
sent.” 9 This is particularly acute given the irrevocability of FGM/ C. As 
Dworkin puts it:
 Some of the decisions we make are of such a character that they produce 
changes which are in one or another way irreversible. Situations are created 
in which it is diffi cult or impossible to return to anything like the initial 
stage at which the decision was mad e. 10 
 T hus the burden is high when it comes to the question of voluntary 
action. At the core of the anti- FGM/ C campaign is the notion that 
circumcision is a coercive act, and that mothers who choose it and 
daughters who more or less willingly submit are both victims of false 
consciousness about the real interests they had  before they were social-
ized to endorse FGM/ C. Consent to circumcise can never, in this sense, 
be taken as genuine. But neither are all anti- FGM/ C advocates happy 
with being labeled paternalists. As a result, signifi cant effort goes into 
creating conditions in which consent will be forthcoming. Much turns 
on whether this constructive creation of consent is an offer that can 
be refused. There is an obvious resource imbalance between well- 
prepared and informed international interveners and local women. 
As a result, even at its most sensitive, such an intervention entails a 
degree, however attenuated, of structural violence (the power to turn 
up in a village thousands of miles from home and insist on changing 
long- established social norms). These local women will not be arriving 
in London or New York any time soon to take a look at how citizens 
in the United Kingdom and United States treat their childr en. 
  9  Feinberg,  Harm to Self , 15. Feinberg also terms this as “soft anti- paternalism” 
on the basis that it does not override genuine consent, the classic case of 
paternalism in action and the one for which he argues the term should be 
reserved. 
 10  Dworkin, “Paternalism,” 80. 
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 A s a social practice, therefore, and regardless of how we might 
defi ne it, paternalistic FGM/ C elimination cannot evade the context 
within which it takes place, one  where a global set of institutions with 
a structural power advantage trump local claims to autonomy and 
parental authority. This is where human rights (and as part of that, 
women’s and children’s rights) comes in. Much work on paternalism 
talks about how a state or society can legitimately treat one of its 
own members. By claiming we are all citizens of the same universal 
society, the objection that we have not consented to “the rule of law” 
is avoided. We are all subject to natural law, and its customary and 
positivist embodiments, regardless of consent. This refl ects a distinc-
tion I have made elsewhere between Human Rights and human rights, 
the former (upper case) universal, global, and monotheistic in voice 
(natural law), the latter (lower case) bottom- up, interpretive, and fl ex-
ible in the hands of local people (democracy). An other way to see the 
generation of local consent by the “soft paternalists” of the FGM/ C 
movement is as a way to make Human Rights into human rights. The 
end – Human Rights, that is, eliminating FGM/ C – is not really nego-
tiable, only the means and the timing of chan ge. 11 
 This “state of exception” will last until local people are able to enact 
their rights  appropriately for themselves (until Human Rights become 
human rights). It is reminiscent of the moment Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak describes when “the protection of woman (today the ‘third 
world woman’) becomes the signifi er for the establishment of a  good 
society which must, at such inaugurative moments, transgress mere 
legality, and equity of legal policy.” She goes on: “In this particular 
case [widow burning or  sati ], the process also allowed the redefi nition 
as a crime what had been tolerated, known or adulated as ritual.” 12 
In just this way, paternalism trumps existing norms within local soci-
ety to criminalize and eliminate the ritual of FGM/ C in the name of 
moral progress as well as the good of the child. But soft paternalism 
goes even further:  It creates not just the institutional site for choos-
ing Human Rights (thereby changing behavior), it also seeks to con-
struct (or “free”) newly self- aware women who can then see their real 
 11  See  Stephen  Hopgood ,  The Endtimes of Human Rights ( Ithaca :  Cornell 
University Press ,  2013 ). 
 12  Gayatri Chakravorty  Spivak , “ Can the Subaltern Speak? ” in  Marxism and the 
Interpretation of Culture , eds.  Cary  Nelson and  Lawrence  Grossberg ( Urbana : 
 University of Illinois Press ,  1988 ),  271 – 313 . 
Stephen Hopgood260
260
interests for themselves. There is a strong ideological commitment to 
the idea of the liberal subject at the heart of soft paternalism, in other 
words, a subject capable of demanding her right to choose. Once this 
sense of agency has taken hold, the state of exception can be lifted. To 
paraphrase Hannah Arendt, you once again have a place in the world 
and so regain  your right to have rights . 13 I n this way soft paternal-
ism might be construed as more radically invasive than hard paternal-
ism, as a major instance of what Barnett and Duvall call “produ ctive 
po wer.” 14 
 F or those, including queer theorists, radical feminists, anthropolo-
gists, postcolonialists, and poststructuralists, who are wary of totaliz-
ing narratives that justify intervention in the politics of female, African 
bodies, with all its colonial and patriarchal overtones, this is a prob-
lem. We have trodden this route before, say critics. 15 Furthermore, if 
we take a more radical view of subjectivity with Fo ucault (that one of 
power’s fi rst effects is to  make the individual , rather than to act upon 
already constituted individuals), we see that closing off the option of 
alternative subjectivities until eighteen, for example, an age long past 
primary identity formation, makes the liberal subject’s triumph a self- 
fulfi lling process. 16 Paternalistic intervention in the case of FGM/ C 
goes a lot deeper, in other words, than simply eliminating a dangerous 
and damaging ritual. It creates a sense of individual entitlement that 
is the basis for the liberal subject’s claim for her rights against the 
state, against society, and against her parents. It is also the vanguard 
for new gender norms that challenge existing ideas of appropriate 
womanhood. T he adult woman whose autonomy (that is, her Human 
Rights) must be protected from paternalism is herself the product of a 
 13  Hannah  Arendt ,  The Origins of Totalitarianism ( New York :  Harvest Books , 
 1973 ),  296 . 
 14  Michael  N. Barnett and  Raymond  Duvall , “ Power in International Politics ,” 
 International Organization  59 ,  1 ( 2005 ). 
 15  As Leslye Obiora puts it, “rescuing non- white women from the barbarity 
of the culture into which they had the misfortune of being born played an 
important role in justifying the imperial project,” see  Leslye Amede  Obiora , 
“ The Anti- Female Circumcision Campaign Defi cit ,” in  Female Circumcision 
and the Politics of Knowledge: African Women in Imperialist Discourse , ed. 
 Obioma  Nnaemeka ( Westport :  Praeger Publishers ,  2005 ),  183 . 
 16  Michel  Foucault ,  Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 
1975– 76 , eds.  Mauro  Bertani and  Alessandro  Fontana , trans.  David  Macey 
( New York :  Picador ,  1997 ),  29 – 30 . 
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paternalism struggle waged years earlier rather than the pristine fl ow-
ering of a natural self grown to maturity. She is made, not born, to 
paraphrase de Beauv o ir. 
 T he rest of this chapter explores these questions further. The fi rst 
section is an introduction to the scale and scope of FGM/ C and the 
second section looks at elimination politics historically and in the 
contemporary environment. In the third section I  unpack the ques-
tion of paternalism and human rights, examining hard and soft vari-
ants alongside the Human Rights/ human rights distinction. I  also 
ask whether less judgmental, more community- based trust- building 
interventions designed to eliminate FGM/ C, and so- called “libe rtarian 
paternalism,” are still paternalistic. In the fourth section I analyze in 
more depth the site of this normative battle. The thrust of elimination 
efforts is a familiar, colonial- style argument about the liberal subject 
not as constructed but as freed from “involuntary servitude” (women, 
nascent bearers of rights, having hitherto been imprisoned by culture). 
But this is simply the beginning. The argument that girls should be 
 free to choose (that they are liberal subjects) is located within a set 
of claims about femininity, sexuality, and maternalism that contain 
strong further assumptions about appropriate identity choices. In 
addition, the freedom to choose is hampered by an economic context 
that makes many meaningful choices impossible. It is also marked by 
a great deal of liberal hypocris y. 
 T he Scale and Scope of FGM/ C 
 FGM/ C is widespread in as many as twenty- nine African countries 
stretching from Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya to Mali, Senegal, and Nigeria. 
Estimates of the number of girls and women who have undergone 
FGM/ C until recently varied between about 100 million and 140 mil-
lion, fi gures which confi rm both its scale and legitimacy. 17 It was further 
 17  The most recent detailed data available is found in:  United Nations Children’s 
Fund ,  Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting: A Statistical Overview and 
Exploration of the Dynamics of Change ( New York :  UNICEF ,  2013 ),  www.
childinfo.org/ fi les/ FGCM_ Lo_ res.pdf (accessed July 12, 2016) and Charlotte 
Feldman- Jacobs and Donna Clifton, “Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting: Data 
and Trends Update 2014” (Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, 
2014),  www.prb.org/ Publications/ Datasheets/ 2014/ fgm- wallchart- 2014.aspx 
(accessed July 12, 2016). Note both these reports use the term “female genital 
mutilation/ cutting.” 
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estimated that about three million girls, the majority under fi fteen years 
of age, undergo FGM/ C every year (typically pre- puberty, aged seven or 
eight). 18 However, more up- to- date data from Southeast Asia, especially 
Indonesia, has led UNICEF to add an incredible seventy million to the 
total of girls and women thought to be cut, increasing the total fi gure 
to 200 million (although the severity of cutting in Southeast Asia is at 
issue, see below). 19 The majority of FGM/ C cases continue to be in Africa 
although it is also found in the Middle East (e.g., in Iraq and Yemen) and 
is an increasing issue among migrant communities in Western states. 20 
 Particularly in its most invasive form, infi bulation, FGM/ C carries 
several potential health risks including traumatic pain, infection, and 
serious complications with childbirth. 21 It is by no means the same 
 18  Some evidence suggests the age is getting earlier in certain cases (Kenya, for 
example) in order to defeat legislation by circumcising the girls before they 
become more socially visible. 
 19  On the 2016 UNICEF estimate, see “New Statistical Report on Female Genital 
Mutilation Shows Harmful Practice is a Global Concern,”  www.unicef.org/ 
media/ media_ 90033.html (accessed July 12, 2016). 
 20  The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children in the 
United Kingdom has referred thirty- four cases of FGM/ C to the police for 
prosecution: “Female Genital Mutilation Helpline Uncovers 34 Potential 
Cases,”  Guardian , September 5, 2013,  www.theguardian.com/ society/ 2013/ 
sep/ 05/ female- genital- mutilation- helpline- cases (accessed November 9, 2015). 
See also Alison Brysk, “Changing Hearts and Minds,” in  The Persistent Power 
of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance , eds. Thomas Risse, 
Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 259– 74, 265– 7. 
 21  There is considerable variety in the kinds of FGM/ C which take place and 
almost all books on the subject include graphic accounts of the various 
“categories” (usually reduced to three or four): clitoridectomy, which 
involves the removal of part or all of the clitoris; excision, which subsumes 
clitoridectomy and also involves the removal of the labia minora; and 
infi bulation (or pharaonic circumcision) which usually involves removing all of 
the external genitalia and, crucially, the stitching together of the vulval opening 
to leave only a small hole. Some types of clitoridectomy, known as  sunna to 
mark them out as sanctioned by Islam, only involve the removal of the prepuce 
(hood) of the clitoris; see  Nahid  Toubia ,  Female Genital Mutilation: A Call 
for Global Action , 2nd edn ( New York :  Rainbo ,  1995 ),  10 – 11 , and  Esther 
K.  Hicks ,  Infi bulation ( New Brunswick :  Transaction Publishers ,  1993 ),  9 –
 12 . Most current studies refer to the four- fold World Health Organization
description that includes the categories clitoridectomy, excision, infi bulation,
and “other” which encompasses “all other harmful procedures to the female
genitalia for non- medical purposes, e.g. pricking, piercing, incising, scraping
and cauterizing the genital area,” a defi nition that not only opens up the
question of comparison to male circumcision but also comparison with
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operation across societies, however, differing between communities and 
within and between regions, countries, and ethnic/ tribal groups in terms 
of the physical content of the operation, its social/ cultural meaning, and 
the attendant long- term health effects. In much of Southeast Asia, for 
example, it seems the practice currently only requires witnessing “a sin-
gle drop of blood” or, at worst, the removal of a tiny piece of fl esh rather 
than the removal of any part of the girl’s sex organs or re- stitching. 22 
 In the Horn of Africa, where FGM/ C’s historical roots lie (in the 
Arab slave trade), infi bulation appears to be perpetuated by beliefs 
about marriage prospects, the value ascribed to female chastity and 
virginity more generally, especially in a society where men are fre-
quently absent, to fears about social acceptance, and (erroneously but 
effectively) that it is a practice required by Islam. 23 By contrast, in 
Southeast Asia, according to William Gervase Clarence- Smith, it is not 
only likely FGM/ C was brought to the region by Islam in the thir-
teenth century, the Shafi ’i school of Islam continues to be an important 
reason for FGM/ C’s continuation. As he puts it:
 The Shafi ’i school of law, widespread in the Indian Ocean, is unique in 
Sunni Islam in declaring female circumcision to be obligatory. In the fi vefold 
ethical terminology of Islam, this ranks above the term for honorable or 
recommended, which is applied to female circumcision by the three other 
surviving Sunni schools of law, as well as by the Shi’a. 24 
 In many parts of Africa (e.g., Kenya, the Gambia, and Sierra Leone), 
excision and clitoridectomy are the usual kinds of FGM/ C. In these 
numerous cosmetic genital procedures in the West. World Health Organization, 
“Female Genital Mutilation,” Fact Sheet no. 241, 2013,  www.who.int/ 
mediacentre/ factsheets/ fs241/ en/ (accessed July 12, 2016). 
 22  William Gervase  Clarence- Smith , “ Female Circumcision in Southeast Asia since 
the Coming of Islam ,” in  Self- Determination and Women’s Rights in Muslim 
Societies , eds.  Chitra  Raghavan and  James P.  Levine ( Waltham :  Brandeis 
University Press ,  2012 ),  114 . This may be changing, however, with the rise 
of a more radical version of Islam in Southeast Asia leading possibly to more 
girls being cut and more invasive forms of cutting: Clarence- Smith, “Female 
Circumcision in Southeast Asia since the Coming of Islam,” 120. 
 23  Hicks,  Infi bulation . On the role that marriage prospects play in FGM/ C’s 
perseverance, see  Gerry  Mackie’s seminal article, “ Ending Footbinding and 
Infi bulation: A Convention Account ,”  American Sociological Review  61 
( 1996 ):  999 – 1017 . 
 24  Clarence- Smith, “Female Circumcision in Southeast Asia since the Coming of 
Islam,” 110– 11. See also fn. 22 above. 
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societies, circumcision is a key ritual in the passage to womanhood 
which can be accompanied by celebrations, present- giving, feasting, 
and the inclusion and seclusion of girls in secret societies so they can 
be socialized in age- related groupings as female members of their 
communities. FGM/ C has also been an ethnic (and national) identity 
marker; it was promoted, for example, in Kenya during the colonial 
liberation. 25 FGM/ C’s  underlying structure is patriarchal (it privileges 
the position and interests of men) but ethnographic work confi rms it 
is women who most strongly perpetuate circumcision. It is one area 
of social life over which they exercise signifi cant control in societies 
where the status positions open to them are few. Circumcision is then 
reinforced by the powerful vested interests of midwives who usually 
perform circumcisions and who receive income and prestige from their 
high- status occupation. 
 The most extensive report so far produced on FGM/ C was pub-
lished by UNICEF in July 2013. 26 Based on statistical data from 
surveys going back twenty years, the report highlighted several key 
fi ndings. First, prevalence rates differ greatly depending on religion, 
ethnicity, region, urbanization and education, even within countries. 
Second, while there remain many high- prevalence countries (more 
than 80 percent of girls and women of reproductive age have been 
cut in Somalia, Guinea, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Mali, Sierra Leone, 
and the Sudan), the trend in many countries, especially those with 
lower prevalence rates already, appears to be a (sometimes steep) 
decline in the practice. The primary evidence for this comes from 
comparing, in 2011, the percentage of women aged 45– 49 who 
have been cut with those aged 15– 19. 27 This yields a more promis-
ing result than just calculating overall prevalence among all age 
groups, including all the women between nineteen and forty- fi ve. 
Third, in many countries a substantial majority of girls and women 
aged 15– 49 who have been cut say they think FGM/ C should be 
 25  See most famously  Jomo  Kenyatta ,  Facing Mount Kenya ( New York :  Vintage 
Books ,  1965 ). Also  Alison  Brysk ,  Speaking Rights to Power: Constructing 
Political Will ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  2013 ),  89 . In a recent case, 
the village of Myabé in Chad, FGM/ C was only introduced in 1980;  Lori 
 Leonard , “ ‘We Did it for Pleasure Only’: Hearing Alternative Tales of Female 
Circumcision ,”  Qualitative Inquiry  6 ,  2 ( 2000 ):  212– 28 . 
 26  UNICEF, “Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting.” 
 27  Ibid . , 99– 101. 
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stopped. 28 These women are, in principle, less likely to cut their own 
daughters (thereby accelerating the rate of reduction in FGM/ C) 
although the power of reinforcing norms about social acceptance, 
marriage, and virginity makes this only an assumption. 29 
 There are as yet too few data points over time, and too much 
ambiguity in terms of reporting, to reach defi nitive conclusions. 
Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that where the practice is already at 
a lower prevalence rate decline has set in. This may not be irreversible 
but in the case of Kenya, Tanzania, Benin, Central African Republic, 
Iraq, Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Togo, the trend is fairly clearly 
downward at a rapid rate. Burkina- Faso and Ethiopia, two higher- 
prevalence countries, have also seen notable declines. 30 What is not 
clear, however, is exactly why. It could be increases in education and 
wealth, or the adoption of anti- FGM/ C legislation (e.g., in Burkina- 
Faso, although fear of legal consequences may also artifi cially boost 
the number of girls and women reporting they have not had FGM/ C 
whatever the reality), or the widespread public education campaigns 
against the practice in many of the countries concerned. One impor-
tant case is Senegal, where the organization Tostan pioneered a human 
rights- based “community empowerment model” that we look at in 
more detail below. 
 If a majority of girls and women, even if they have experienced FGM/ 
C, would prefer that the practice cease, information and education 
would seem to have had a signifi cant effect. This would be a major 
achievement because it tips the balance in favor of “consent” to elimi-
nation (although it masks signifi cant national and ethnic differences). 
This has been facilitated by new communications technology, growing 
social mobility, and urbanization. Where FGM/ C is already a minority 
practice, and where those who have been cut more frequently encounter 
uncut girls and women, wider cultural norms may simply be absorbing 
and assimilating local norms through the kind of process classic mod-
ernization theorists predicted. This is likely to be particularly effective 
where FGM/ C is already a minority practice which in most cases means 
countries that are not majority- Islamic. In hard cases change is almost 
non- existent: Chad, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea- Bissau, Mali, Somalia, 
 28  Ibid . , 77. 
 29  Ibid . , 80. 
 30  Ibid . , 114– 15. 
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Sudan, and Yemen. In the case of Djibouti, there has been a move 
toward a less invasive form of FGM/ C. But in the main, prevalence rates 
remain high. Although not all are Islamic states, the impression that 
Islam requires FGM/ C has an important reinforcing role among adher-
ents. 31 Where almost all girls and women are circumcised, changing the 
basic social norm (whereby social acceptance requires FGM/ C) to the 
opposite norm (social acceptance requires not subjecting young girls 
to FGM/ C) is a formidable task. 32 Confl ict, inaccessibility, and poverty 
make several of these countries diffi cult to access physically, especially 
in their interiors. Facing hostile governments in Somalia, Sudan, and 
Yemen does not help. The strategies that appear to have worked in 
many of the cases where FGM/ C is declining may be of little use here. 
 FGM/ C is also sustained by migrant communities outside Africa. 
Although FGM/ C had been illegal in the United Kingdom since 1985 
through the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act, a further tougher 
Female Genital Mutilation Act was passed in 2003. 33 Despite evidence 
that young girls are sometimes sent back to their countries of origin 
to undergo FGM/ C, it was only in March 2014 that the fi rst pros-
ecutions under the act were brought (both against men). 34 In France, 
by contrast, there have been more than one hundred prosecutions. 
Prominent women’s rights campaigner Julie Bindel claims as many as 
65,000 young girls in the United Kingdom are at risk from FGM/ C. 35 
In London, in particular, where there are sizeable populations of 
migrants from FGM/ C- practicing parts of Africa, former mayor 
Boris Johnson established an FGM Taskforce. Even Malala, icon of a 
 31  In Egypt the state has led efforts to challenge this claim as well as stress the 
health dangers of FGM/ C, but the results are not promising; Amel Fahmy, 
“Can We Really Eliminate FGM in Egypt by 2030?,”  openGlobalRights , July 
2015,  www.opendemocracy.net/ openglobalrights/ amel- fahmy/ can- we- really- 
eliminate- fgm- in- egypt- by- 2030 (accessed July 12, 2016). 
 32  To shift from a bad equilibrium to a good one, in other words: see Mackie, 
“Ending Footbinding and Infi bulation.” 
 33  Note the name change. 
 34  It was alleged in July 2015 that as many as fi fty Somali girls born in the United 
Kingdom had been taken back to Somalia to be circumcised; “ ‘Fifty girls’ 
taken from UK to Somalia for FGM,”  BBC News , July 17, 2015,  www.bbc.
co.uk/ news/ uk- 33572428 (accessed July 12, 2016). 
 35  Julie  Bindel ,  An Unpunished Crime: The Lack of Prosecutions for Female 
Genital Mutilation in the UK ( London :  The New Culture Forum ,  2014 ). 
The evidence on the extent of FGM/ C in Europe and North America is not 
good: UNICEF, “Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting,” 17. 
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new generation of women’s and children’s rights advocates, has been 
enlisted to the cause, as has the Duchess of Cornwall. Current esti-
mates in the United States suggest that more than half a million women 
and girls are at risk of FGM/ C. 36 It seems reasonable to assume that 
these numbers will fall as young people within migrant communities 
are socialized to Western norms, as the law is enforced, and as those 
entering Western countries from FGM/ C- practicing countries are less 
and less likely to have experienced FGM/ C themselves (although many 
migrants are from the hard cases in the Horn of Afri ca). 
 T he Global Campaign against FGM/ C 
 In 2012, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution titled, 
“Intensifying global efforts for the elimination of female genital 
mutilations.” This followed UN recognition of February 6 as “The 
International Day of Zero Tolerance on FGM,” a date pioneered at the 
2003 Inter- African Committee (IAC) on Traditional Practices Affecting 
the Health of Women and Children at its conference in Addis Ababa. By 
2015, the proposed Sustainable Development Goals, successors to the 
Millennium Development Goals, included (as item 5.3): “Eliminate all 
harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female 
genital mutilations.” 37 The United Nations’ explicit commitment after 
two decades of work by activists to the global elimination of FGM/ C 
is a milestone, making FGM/ C a part of the United Nations’ formal 
mission, not just an issue for its operational agencies. 
 Th is achievement came nearly ninety years after early anti- FGM/ 
C campaigners, including Western missionaries, began a concerted 
effort to eliminate FGM/ C in Africa. 38 In 1924, for example, all 
British district commissioners in the Sudan received a circular telling 
them to encourage “enlightened natives who had begun to abolish or 
 36  Howard  Goldberg , Paul Stupp, Ekwutosi Okoroh, Ghenet Besera, David 
Goodman, and Isabella Danel, “ Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting in the 
United States: Updated Estimates of Women and Girls at Risk, 2012 ,”  Public 
Health Reports ( Atlanta :  Center for Disease Control and Prevention ,  2016 ), 
vol.  131 . 
 37  “Open Working Group Proposal for Sustainable Development Goals,” 
Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform,  https:// sustainabledevelopment.
un.org/ sdgsproposal (accessed November 9, 2015). 
 38  On circumcision politics under colonial rule in the Sudan, see  Heather 
 Bell ,  Frontiers of Medicine in the Anglo- Egyptian Sudan, 1899– 1940 
( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  1999 ), ch. 7, and  Janice  Boddy ,  Civilizing 
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modify the custom.” 39 This moral crusade was actually an early form 
of biopolitics, according to Janice Boddy: Concerned that infi bulation 
led to low birth rates and high infant mortality, colonial authorities tar-
geted FGM/ C as a way to increase the child- bearing potential of Arab 
women. 40 At the same time as the colonial state tried to apply social 
and political pressure for the elimination of infi bulation, eventually 
seeking an alliance, for example, with the Sudan’s Islamic leader, the 
Grand Mufti, the formidable matron of the Midwives Training School 
in Omdurman, Mabel  E. Wolff, and her sister Gertrude, were educating 
trainee Sudanese midwives to practice a less destructive form of FGM/ 
C than infi bulation. Despite her strong objection to “the barbarous cus-
tom,” Wolff was well aware that a form of medicalization was far more 
likely to show positive results in terms of the suffering of infi bulated 
Sudanese women. 41 
 I n London, meanwhile, two pioneering female MPs, the Duchess of 
Atholl and Eleanor Rathbone, joined forces in 1929 on an all- party 
Committee for the Protection of Coloured Women in the Crown 
Colonies. 42 Spurred on by testimony from missionaries, Atholl and 
Rathbone were soon active in trying to stop FGM/ C in Kenya as well 
as the Sudan. 43 In Kenya, attempts by the missionaries to coerce local 
people into abandoning FGM/ C (by refusing them communion, for 
example) not only failed but led to a radicalization of the Kikuyu pop-
ulation. This was a foretaste of things to come during the independ-
ence struggles when FGM/ C played a prominent role in the Mau Mau 
rebellion, as well as being linked to the  Ngaitana movement in which 
young girls in Meru, Kenya, denied FGM/ C by tribal elders who had 
liaised with the British, went into the bush to circumcise themsel v es. 44 
Women: British Crusades in the Sudan ( Princeton :  Princeton University 
Press ,  2007 ). On Kenya, see, for example,  Susan  Pedersen , “ National 
Bodies, Unspeakable Acts: The Sexual Politics of Colonial Policy- Making ,” 
 Journal of Modern History  63 ( 1991 ):  647– 80 , and  Margaret E.  Keck and 
 Kathryn  Sikkink ,  Activists Beyond Borders ( Ithaca :  Cornell University Press , 
 1998 ), 67– 72. 
 39  Boddy,  Civilizing Women , 173. 
 40  Ibid . , 172. 
 41  Ibid . , 196. 
 42  Ibid . , 234. 
 43  Pedersen, “National Bodies, Unspeakable Acts.” 
 44  Lynn M.  Thomas , “ ‘ Ngaitana (I Will Circumcise Myself)’: The Gender and 
Generational Politics of the 1956 Ban on Clitoridectomy in Meru, Kenya ,” in 
 Gendered Colonialisms in African History , eds.  Nancy Rose  Hunt ,  Tessie P. 
 Liu , and  Jean  Quataert ( Oxford :  Basil Blackwell ,  1997 ). 
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 Th ese early efforts made little progress but they did reveal that, han-
dled badly, anti- FGM/ C efforts could produce signifi cant resistance. 
After decolonization, and the rapid departure of colonial offi cials from 
Africa and Asia, next to nothing occurred in terms of anti- FGM/ C 
activities until the 1970s when there was suddenly an explosion of 
interest linked to the emerging women’s movement. Some American 
feminists were very vocal about the “barbarity” of FGM/ C from the 
start. In the words of the most prominent early American campaigner, 
Fran Hosken, FGM/ C arose out of “contempt for the female of the 
species,” where, “What are called ‘cultural traditions’ in reality are 
practices that support the ritual abuse of women, systematically dam-
aging women’s health and strength to make sure of their subordina-
tion to men.” 45 
 In an earlier version of her  Hosken Report , Hosken had written: “It 
is evident that female genital mutilation can be abolished and wiped 
out in our lifetime. We are able to teach those who cling to distorted 
beliefs and damaging practices some better ways to cope with them-
selves, their lives, reproduction and sexuality. We know that every-
one on earth has the capacity to learn.” 46 Many African feminists 
objected deeply to the overt neocolonial paternalism of this sort of 
Western feminist dialogue. 47 Corinne Kratz contrasts the self- image of 
many Western feminists in the 1970s with their view of “third world 
women” who needed saving because they were without agency and 
thus “powerless, constrained by a tradition defi ned by men, unable to 
think clearly, and having only problems and needs, not choices.” 48 In 
contrast to the strong paternalism of early American campaigners, an 
infl uential British report from 1980 struck a different, if no less patron-
izing, tone about African women working to end FGM/ C: “They are 
beginning the delicate task of helping women free themselves from 
 45  Fran  Hosken ,  The Hosken Report: Genital and Sexual Mutilation of Females , 
4th edn ( Lexington, MA :  Women’s International Network ,  1994 ),  9 ,  16 ; 
 Claude E.  Welch Jr.,  Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Roles and Strategies 
of Non- Governmental Organizations ( Philadelphia :  University of Pennsylvania 
Press ,  1995 ),  104 , fn. 4. 
 46  Quoted in Boddy,  Civilizing Women , 309. 
 47  Brysk,  Speaking Rights to Power , 90. 
 48  Corinne  Kratz ,  Affecting Performance ( Washington, DC :  Smithsonian 
Institution Press ,  1994 ),  343 . See also  Chandra Talpade  Mohanty , “ Under 
Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses ,”  Feminist Review 
 30 ( 1988 ):  61 – 88 . 
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customs which have no advantage and many risks for their physical 
and psychological well- being, without at the same time destroying the 
supportive and benefi cial threads of their cultural fab ric.” 49 
 Th at the hard paternalism of these early efforts was a problem is 
evident. Despite facile efforts at demonization, the “perpetrators” 
of FGM/ C are not sadists or pathological child abusers. Those who 
perpetuate the practice are mothers, grandmothers, and other vil-
lage women who do it from an ethic of care and concern for their 
daughters. They have what they see as their daughters’ best interests 
at heart. As Yoder  et al. put it: “Mothers organize the circumcision of 
their daughters because that is considered part of raising a girl prop-
erly, of being a responsible mother … women in central Guinea … 
said that their religion required that parents do three things for their 
daughters: ‘to educate them, to circumcise them, and to fi nd them a 
good husband.’ ” 50 Consider Ellen Gruenbaum’s description of a cir-
cumcision in Sudan:  “Children dressed up with special ornaments 
and new clothes, a surgical procedure, ululations, small gifts and con-
gratulations, no patriarchal authority fi gure overseeing and dictating 
the sequence of events.” 51 Like many other major life events, this was 
a moment for celebration with family, friends, and neighbors rather 
than a matter for shame or regret, and women are its central acto rs. 
 Ear ly anti- FGM/ C efforts took place in the absence of any system-
atic reference to human rights for two reasons:  as an international 
movement it was in its infancy at the time, and the movement’s focus 
was almost exclusively civil and political, much to the irritation of 
women’s rights and LGBT rights activists in the 1980s. From 1993 
onward, following Vienna’s World Conference on Human Rights, 
FGM/ C was increasingly “reconceptualized as a human rights viola-
tion,” that is, as gender- based violence against women and children. 52 
Human rights were becoming the dominant frame, refl ecting a shift in 
 49  Scilla  McLean and  Stella Efua  Graham , eds.,  Female Circumcision, Excision 
and Infi bulation: The Facts and Proposals for Change , second rev. edn 
( London :  The Minority Rights Group ,  1985 ),  3 . 
 50  Stanley P.  Yoder ,  Noureddine  Abderrahim , and  Arlinda  Zhuzhuni , “ Female 
Genital Cutting in the Demographic and Health Surveys: A Critical and 
Comparative Analysis ,”  DHS Comparative Reports  No. 7 ( Calverton, 
MD :  ORC Macro ,  2004 ),  13 . 
 51  Ellen  Gruenbaum ,  The Female Circumcision Controversy: An Anthropological 
Perspective ( Philadelphia :  University of Pennsylvania Press ,  2000 ),  59 . 
 52  UNICEF, “Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting,” 6. 
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the late 1980s when the term “female genital mutilation” or FGM was 
coined by the Geneva- based IAC. Use of the term FGM soon became a 
marker of one’s position on the advocacy spectrum. One of the earliest 
anti- FGM/ C advocacy organizations, Equality Now, was founded in 
New York in 1992 (by, among others, former UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Navi Pillay). It remains active on a whole array of 
issues concerning the treatment of women and girls; its total income 
in 2012 was nearly four million dollars. 53 Gloria Steinem, prominent 
in early anti- FGM/ C campaigns, remains on its board. Equality Now’s 
fi rst anti- FGM/ C newsletter,  Awaken , published in 1997 in English, 
Arabic, and French, was subtitled,  Towards a better understanding 
and a more effective strategy for the eradication of all forms of female 
circumcision . In its fi rst issue, the editor wrote:  “ Awaken will not 
judge the material that appears on its pages by which term is being 
used by those who contribute to it.” 54 FGM, FC (female circumcision) 
and genital surgery or genital cutting were all judged acceptable. But 
most letters and contributions from readers in subsequent issues used 
the term FGM until it became clear that for Western- based global 
advocacy only “FGM” would do. 
 This battle over naming had fi rst burst into the open at 1980’s 
Copenhagen UN Conference on women when African activ-
ists objected to the tone of Western feminists and, critically for 
 paternalists, denied the very right of those Western women to lead 
elimination efforts. 55 As we have seen, UNICEF and some other oper-
ational agencies like the UN Population Fund have adopted the term 
FGM/ C, as has the infl uential Washington, DC- based Population 
Reference Bureau. In its statistical report, UNICEF explicitly refers 
to having “tact and patience” and using “respectful terminology.” 56 
The World Health Organization and UN Women retain the “FGM” 
framing and the UN General Assembly’s 2012 global ban explicitly 
uses that term. 
 In 1997, Somali- born supermodel Waris Dirie, herself circumcised, 
had become the “UN Ambassador for the Elimination of FGM,” and 
 53  See:  www.equalitynow.org (accessed July 12, 2016). 
 54  Awaken 1, 1 (June 1997). 
 55  Nahid Toubia,  Program Guidelines for Integrating Activities to Eradicate 
Female Genital Mutilation , USAID, May 1997,  http:// pdf.usaid.gov/ pdf_ docs/ 
PNACB026.pdf (accessed July 12, 2016), Appendix A, 1– 2. 
 56  UNICEF, “Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting,” 7. 
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in 1998 she published her bestselling autobiography  Desert Flower . 57 
In the same year, USAID fi rmed up its position on FGM. While rec-
ognizing “the need for sensitivity to the perception of interference 
in local cultural beliefs and practices,” the “unequivocal consensus” 
at the international level meant that, “there is now less reason to be 
hesitant about openly committing to support for FGM eradication 
programs.” 58 In this report, written for USAID by prominent FGM/ 
C activist Nahid Toubia, the story of the 1990s  – greater attention 
to mainstreaming gender, the linking of health to individual human 
rights, intense domestic pressure, and the succession of major inter-
national conferences at which women’s rights were central (Vienna 
1993, Cairo 1994, and Beijing 1995) – culminated in a detailed and, 
crucially,  proactive USAID elimination policy from 2000 onw ar d. 59 
 H uman Rights/ human rights 
 As argued above, all forms of anti- FGM/ C advocacy rely on a human 
rights frame to legitimate their intervention. Ne vertheless, the interna-
tional movement against female circumcision could broadly be seen to 
divide along a Human Rights/ human rights fault line which maps on 
to the use of the terms FGM (Human Rights/ hard paternalism) ver-
sus FGM/ C (human rights/ soft paternalism). 60 For the former, human 
rights are an end in themselves, FGM another and particularly egre-
gious example of a human rights violation – violence against women 
and children – that must be stopped at all costs. For the latter, human 
rights are one means among others to try to end the practice, the start-
ing point being engagement with the communities concerned and a 
reluctance to use demonizing languag e. 61 Here human rights follow 
 57  We look in more detail at Dirie’s activism in sections 3 and 4 below. 
 58  Toubia,  Program Guidelines for Integrating Activities to Eradicate Female 
Genital Mutilation , 9. 
 59  Many American troops and offi cials returning from Operation Restore Hope 
in Somalia had also been exposed to FGM/ C for the fi rst time, and by the 
mid- 1990s asylum cases were being heard where the risk of being subjected 
to FGM/ C was the rationale for the granting of permanent leave to stay in the 
United States. 
 60  See Hopgood,  The Endtimes of Human Rights . 
 61  There is a third category we might label  skeptics . They are suspicious of 
the moralizing of the anti- FGM movement and seek to challenge advocacy 
myths about the health complications of circumcision and about the 
refusal to compare male and female circumcision in many cases. See, for 
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rather than lead; they need to be mapped on to existing beliefs. In the 
language of the 2013’s UNICEF report:
 The abandonment of FGM/ C is framed not as a criticism of local culture 
but as a better way to attain the core positive values that underlie tradition 
and religion, including “doing no harm to others”. We have found that, 
addressed in this way, efforts to end FGM/ C contribute to the larger issues 
of ending violence against children and women and confronting gender 
inequalities. 62 
 A s an example of the Human Rights position, take the report by 
Julie Bindel on FGM in the United Kingdom, titled  An Unpunished 
Crime . This refers to “a procedure that belongs in the dark ages” and 
“a catalogue of torture.” This pure paternalism takes us back to the 
1970s. A campaign by major UK newspapers led by London’s  Evening 
Standard and the national newspaper,  The Times , carries the message 
that the law must be implemented at all costs. 63 Bindel is forthright that 
sensitivity over paternalism is the main reason, in addition to prob-
lems of evidence gathering, for the failure of the British authorities to 
tackle FGM: “By far the most important factor … is excessive cultural 
sensitivity: quite simply, there is a reluctance to combat the practice of 
FGM for fear of appearing reactionary or prejudiced. Here, the laud-
able desire to show respect for other cultures has degenerated into a 
form of paralysis – a terror of taking vigorous action just because the 
practice occurs overwhelmingly in migrant communit ies.” 64 
 The absolutist Human Rights position recalls the discourse of civi-
lization and infantilism by which colonial authorities treated their 
subjects as children who needed educating and disciplining. This is 
hardcore, pure paternalism. Human Rights on this understanding 
example,  Richard A.  Schweder , “ Symposium on German Court Ruling 
on Circumcision: The Goose and the Gander: The Genital Wars ,”  Global 
Discourse  3 ,  2 ( 2013 ):  348– 66 , and  Kirsten  Bell , “ Genital Cutting and Western 
Discourses on Sexuality ,”  Medical Anthropology Quarterly  19 ,  2 ( 2005 ):  125– 
48 . See also,  The Public Policy Advisory Network on Female Genital Surgeries 
in Africa , “ Seven Things to Know About Female Genital Surgeries in Africa ,” 
 The Hastings Center Report  42 ,  6 ( 2012 ):  19 – 27 . 
 62  UNICEF, “Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting,” iii. 
 63  E.g., “It’s Child Abuse that has Gone Mainstream,”  The Times , January 31, 
2014,  www.thetimes.co.uk/ tto/ news/ uk/ crime/ article3991120.ece (accessed 
July 12, 2016). 
 64  Bindel,  An Unpunished Crime , 6– 7. 
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are binary. They condense and submerge complexity under one all- 
encompassing normative standard of right against wrong. It is a 
seductive narrative for would- be saviors. To be progressive you must 
be  pro human rights because there are only two sides. We see this 
clearly in the WHO’s approach. From a position of more cultural 
sensitivity in the 1990s, the WHO in 2014 characterizes the campaign 
totally in Human Rights terms:
 FGM is recognized internationally as a violation of the human rights of girls 
and women. It refl ects deep- rooted inequality between the sexes, and consti-
tutes an extreme form of discrimination against women. It is nearly always 
carried out on minors and is a violation of the rights of children. The prac-
tice also violates a person’s rights to health, security and physical integrity, 
the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
and the right to life when the procedure results in death. 65 
 For Human Rights advocates, the term  female genital mutilation or 
“FGM” is a true description of the nature of the practice. This makes 
FGM/ C a crime, amounting to child abuse and even torture. In the 
words of Waris Dirie:
 FGM has to be eradicated, and it  will be eradicated. It’s barbaric: against 
children and women, against the law, against religion, against humanity. It 
has no place in a human society. It is a crime that seeks justice. 66 
 This is archetypal hard paternalism. Mostly, Human Rights advocates 
have focused on extending legal punishment for FGM/ C including 
threats of imprisonment. 67 The criminal law helps, it is argued, by 
 65  See  World Health Organization ,  Female Genital Mutilation: A Joint WHO/ 
UNICEF/ UNFPA Statement ( Geneva :  World Health Organization ,  1997 ),  1 – 2 , 
 www.childinfo.org/ fi les/ fgmc_ WHOUNICEFJointdeclaration1997.pdf , and 
World Health Organization, “Female Genital Mutilation.” 
 66  Leyla Hussein, “Waris Dirie: ‘Never Give Up. FGM Has to be Eradicated, and 
it Will be Eradicated,’ ”  Cosmopolitan , July 1, 2015,  www.cosmopolitan.co.uk/ 
reports/ news/ a36860/ waris- dirie- fgm- leyla- hussein/ (accessed July 12, 2016). 
 67  One of outgoing Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan’s last acts in 
offi ce in May 2015 was to sign a statute outlawing FGM: Shyamantha 
Asokan, “Nigeria’s Outgoing President Signs Off on Banning Female 
Genital Mutiliation,”  Buzzfeed , May 28, 2015,  www.buzzfeed.com/ 
shyamanthaasokan/ nigerias- president- signs- off- on- banning- fgm?responses#.
ko1LgXXpe (accessed July 12, 2016). 
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giving advocates for abandonment an extra mechanism to exert lever-
age. Even in Senegal, however, legalization and the threat of criminal 
punishment as a strategy in itself may be counter- productive, gener-
ating resistance and driving FGM/ C underground. 68 Human Rights 
advocates have yet to advocate systematically for the use of force but 
there seems little doubt that with available resources they would be 
open to that. 
 W hile acting paternally is associated historically with fathers, and 
therefore with men, acting  in a masculine way implicates women too. 
Indeed, in relation to combatting FGM/ C, the international movement 
has been dominated by female Western feminists. Yet i t is vital to reit-
erate that, despite being an ongoing legacy of structural patriarchy, it 
is women who continue the practice of FGM/ C and that, to stop it in 
the here- and- now, the people who have to cease cutting girls are their 
mothers, aunts, and grandmothers. As we noted, the mothers who cir-
cumcise their daughters do so from an ethic of love and care, not abuse 
and cruelty. Is this better described as a clash between paternalism and 
maternalism, with maternalism as a rival authority claim to paternal-
ism, one that gives the existing rights of mothers a privileged position 
regardless of the content of those maternal claims (e.g., whether or 
not being a mother must mean to be “nurturing”)? Paternalism would 
then be about voiding the authority claims of mothers in the name of 
morality. This echoes a familiar gender dynamic where paternalism 
is identifi ed with rational rights- based moral action and maternalism 
with care- based emotional nurturing. But this way of thinking doesn’t 
take us very far. The insistence of many mothers that their daughters 
be circumcised so they are not ostracized and can make good mar-
riages is just as comprehensible as a form of paternalis m. 
 Ha rd Human Rights paternalism has not only generated resistance, 
there has not been a terminal reduction, as UNICEF’s fi gures show, in 
the prevalence of FGM/ C, despite a century of activism. While Human 
Rights continues to be the dominant frame internationally, and in the 
 68  Bettina  Shell- Duncan , Yiva Hernlund, Katherine Wander, and Amadou 
Moreau, “ Legislating Change? Responses to Criminalizing Female Genital 
Cutting in Senegal ,”  Law and Society Review  47 ,  4 ( 2013 ):  803– 35 . See also 
 Matilda Aberese  Ako and  Patricia  Akweongo , “ The Limited Effectiveness of 
Legislation against Female Genital Mutilation and the Role of Community 
Beliefs in Upper East Region, Ghana ,”  Reproductive Health Matters  17 ,  34 
( 2009 ):  47 – 54 . 
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West, within Africa itself what success there has been has come from a 
more pragmatic, engaged approach which concentrates less on the sym-
bolism of specifi c cases and laws and more on incremental change in 
sympathy with the women concerned. For a time, strategies based on the 
negative health effects of FGM/ C were marginalized by hard paternalists 
who feared this would lead to the legitimation of medicalization (as has 
to some extent happened in Egypt and Indonesia). But more nuanced, 
needs- related arguments quickly returned to complement Human Rights, 
as did the term FGM/ C to provide a less judgmental label than FG M. 69 
 Th is more pragmatic, “soft” paternalism legitimates itself not by over-
riding the liberty of women and their girl children as hard paternalists 
would but by arguing that “genuine consent” hasn’t been forthcoming 
in the fi rst place. Soft paternalists are all about producing consent. They 
pursue this end by stressing education based on an understanding of the 
reasons why FGM/ C continues and sympathizing in a deep way with 
those who have been circumcised. In other words, they try to pursue 
change in partnership with the women concerned, as part of an open, 
discursive, negotiated process. Emphasizing health risks, for example, 
promotes change while maintaining the autonomy and dignity of the 
women concerned. This form of paternalism acknowledges the depth 
of feeling that undergirds FGM/ C and the fact that women and girls 
are part of a meaningful community, rather than individuals waiting 
to be liberated from their cultural prison. The label FGM/ C, FGC, or 
sometimes FC (female circumcision) refl ects this commitme nt. 70 
 Soft paternalism also creates incentives to act in a specifi c way 
rather than issuing moral demands. It seeks compliance rather than 
demands obedience. In their book on framing institutional choices, 
 Nudge , Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein call their approach “lib-
ertarian paternalism.” This entails freedom of choice but choice in a 
world where “it is legitimate for choice architects to try to infl uence 
people’s behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and 
better.” 71 This self- assigned right to change outcomes in the deeper 
 69  Bettina  Shell- Duncan , “ From Health to Human Rights: Female Genital 
Cutting and the Politics of Intervention ,”  American Anthropologist  110 ,  2 
( 2008 ):  225– 36 . 
 70  The epitome of this approach is the UNICEF report, “Female Genital 
Mutilation/ Cutting.” 
 71  Richard H.  Thaler and  Cass R.  Sunstein ,  Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth and Happiness ( New York :  Penguin ,  2009 ),  5 . 
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interests of persons resembles the “capabilities approach” pioneered 
by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. 72 The fi rst step to realizing 
human rights for Sen and Nussbaum is to increase a person’s capac-
ity to make good choices. Giving people full information is critical, 
the assumption being that knowing alternative options exist will stop 
someone from choosing to undergo or propagate cultural practices 
like FGM/ C that may cause them or their children signifi cant har m. 
 These are exercises in institutional power, to be sure, in that they 
create conditions of choice designed to privilege some options and 
exclude others. 73 But in the Nudge example, you can still choose the bad 
option, you just have to expend more effort to get it. In other words, 
you can say no even to paternalism. This makes full information criti-
cal. What if you don’t realize there’s another option? 74 Is it paternalist 
to disguise someone’s full range of options (we try to hide many things 
from children until we think they are able to choose wisely)? If hold-
ing back information and available choices is paternalistic, then giving 
someone more choice would presumably be its opposite? This would 
be Nussbaum’s and Sen’s position. And in many ways the enlighten-
ment position as a whole: We are showing you there’s another way, 
then it’s up to you. 75 Or perhaps these are context- specifi c forms of 
paternalism, depending in each case on the circumstances? The most 
successful attempts to change FGM/ C rely on a shared communication 
mechanism – giving people more information about the availability 
of alternatives (that not circumcising reduces health complications, 
reduces maternal mortality and childbirth pain, that women in the 
next village do not circumcise their daughters and still fi nd marriage 
partners for them). 
 The epitome of this approach is outlined in a publication by 
UNICEF’s social science- led Innocenti Research Centre, called 
 Changing a Harmful Social Convention: Female Genital Mutilation/ 
Cutting . In this report, ground- breaking work on harmful social 
 72  Martha C.  Nussbaum , “ Symposium on Amartya Sen’s Philosophy: 5 Adaptive 
Preferences and Women’s Options ,”  Economics and Philosophy  17 ( 2001 ):  83 , 
and  Amartya  Sen ,  The Idea of Justice ( Cambridge, MA :  Belknap/ Harvard 
University Press ,  2009 ). 
 73  See Barnett and Duvall on “institutional power” in “Power in International 
Politics.” 
 74  See Steven Lukes’ second and third dimensions of power in  Power: A Radical 
View , 2nd edn (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 20– 8. 
 75  We return to the question of choice and agency below. 
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conventions fi gures prominently in informing policy- making. 76 It is 
based on the work of scholar Gerry Mackie who argues that what 
sustains FGM/ C (particularly infi bulation), as with foot- binding in 
China, is the prospect of making a good marriage. It is a self- enforcing 
social convention that can (potentially) be changed quickly. 77 By get-
ting parents and children to pledge not to circumcise their daughters, 
and to allow their sons to marry uncircumcised girls, a critical mass 
of those in non- FGM/ C marriages will be reached and hopefully pass 
“the tipping point” beyond which a new equilibrium is established 
where FGM/ C is no longer the dominant norm. 78 To get to this stage 
requires information, public commitment (in pledging ceremonies) 
and coordination within the community. Although there are other 
FGM/ C- reinforcing norms such as religion, rites of passage and female 
honor and modesty codes, it is changing the marriageability norm that 
matters most in Mackie’s area of research and activism. 79 
 T his work has been an integral part of the most successful effort at 
eliminating FGM/ C. The “Tostan Model” was launched in Senegal in 
1991 by American activist Molly Melching. The model now operates 
in eight countries: Djibouti, Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, 
Senegal, Somalia, and The Gambia. 80 The essence of the Tostan model is a 
three- year “community empowerment program” in local languages that 
 76  United Nations Children’s Fund , “ Changing a Harmful Social 
Convention: Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting ,”  Innocenti Digest 12 
( New York :  UNICEF ,  2005 ), available at:  www.unicef- irc.org/ publications/ pdf/ 
fgm_ eng.pdf (accessed July 12, 2016). See also Mackie’s “Ending Footbinding 
and Infi bulation.” 
 77  See Mackie, “Ending Footbinding and Infi bulation,” and Gerry Mackie 
and John LeJeune, “Social Dynamics of Abandonment of Harmful 
Practices: A New Look at the Theory,”  UNICEF Innocenti Working Paper , 
May 2009,  www.polisci.ucsd.edu/ ~gmackie/ documents/ UNICEF.pdf (accessed 
July 12, 2016). 
 78  Malcolm Gladwell,  The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big 
Difference (New York: Little Brown, 2000). 
 79  Mackie and LeJeune, “Social Dynamics,” 29– 30. 
 80  On Tostan, see also  Yiva  Hernlund and  Bettina  Shell- Duncan , “ Contingency, 
Context and Change: Negotiating Female Genital Cutting in The Gambia 
and Senegal ,”  Africa Today  53 ,  4 ( 2007 ):  43 – 57 ,  Bettina  Shell- Duncan , Yiva 
Hernlund, Katherine Wander, and Amadou Moreau,  Contingency and Change 
in the Practice of Female Genital Cutting: Dynamics of Decision- Making in 
Senegambia ( Seattle :  University of Washington ,  2010 ), and  Charlotte  Feldman- 
Jacobs , ed.,  Ending Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting: Lessons from a Decade 
of Progress ( Washington, DC :  Population Research Bureau ,  2013 ),  16 . 
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fi rst promotes “positive traditions while encouraging discussion of how 
new ideas and practices can help build a healthier community,” following 
which “participants learn to read and write in their own language, study 
basic math, and gain management skills.” 81 The fi rst year’s discussions 
include “deliberation on democracy, human rights and responsibilities, 
problem solving and hygiene and health.” 82 It is in these forums that “the 
tradition” usually becomes a topic of animated conversation. 
 To the suggestion that human rights are a Western imposition, Tostan 
argues that it encourages participants to “deliberate what constitutes 
human dignity and how it can be upheld: a term translated into local 
languages and one that people resonate with. The rights framework 
can then be used as an international framework which supports that 
idea of dignity developed within class.” 83 Rights follow, they do not 
lead. The Tostan approach is more human rights not Human Rights, 
in other words. As activist Lucy Walker puts it:
 To come to human rights in this way  – to work out what a community 
wants and back it up using the framework of human rights – is rather differ-
ent to the usual development rhetoric of going in and waving the declaration 
around and shouting about it! It develops internal agency – the understand-
ing that we have rights and can bring these to our community. 84 
 Similarly, Molly Melching stresses “the importance of non- formal edu-
cation in national languages, the social mobilization work of people 
who were themselves affected by the practice, and an approach based 
on empathy and respect.” 85 And the Tostan approach appears to be 
working. According to the Orchid Project:
 81  “Program Structure,” Tostan,  www.tostan.org/ tostan- model/ community- 
empowerment- program/ program- structure (accessed July 12, 2016). 
 82  This description is from a blog post by Lucy Walker, the Knowledge and 
Programmes Coordinator for an NGO called “The Orchid Project” that 
works with Tostan; see “Tostan’s Human- Rights Approach to Community- 
led Development: the First TTC,” Orchid Project, April 14, 2015,  http:// 
orchidproject.org/ tostans- human- rights- approach- to- community- led- 
development- the- fi rst- ttc/ (accessed July 12, 2016). 
 83  Ibid . 
 84  “A Chance to Experience Tostan Classes,” Orchid Project, May 1, 2015, 
 http:// orchidproject.org/ a- chance- to- experience- tostan- sessions/ (accessed July 
12, 2016). 
 85  See: “Les Contributions de Tostan vers L’abandon de L’Excision Soulignées par 
le Gouvernement du Sénégal et l’ONU,”  Tostan Blog , February 6, 2015, 
Stephen Hopgood280
280
 The proportion of mothers [in Senegal] with at least one daughter who is 
cut has declined from 20% in 2005 to 6.2% in 2010 – a decrease of about 
69%. Between 2005 and 2010, the number of Soninké women (the most 
vulnerable group in 2005) with at least one daughter cut declined by 86.1%. 
Along the same lines, Diola, Fula and Mandinka groups saw a decrease of 
65.1%, 81.8% and 60.2% respectively. Among Christian women, the prac-
tice of FGC has nearly disappeared. In 2005, 11.2% of Christian women 
had a daughter who was cut. This has reduced to 0.9% in 2010, meaning 
a 92% decrease…On the other hand, Muslim women continue to practice, 
although there has been a signifi cant decline. The number of women with 
a daughter who is cut decreased from 20.3% to 6.4% between 2005 and 
2010 – a 68.5% reduction. 86 
 By improving the social acceptance of not circumcising without dam-
aging marriage prospects, rates of FGM/ C have shown a rapid decline. 
These twin reinforcing pressures suggest that where most women one 
meets are circumcised rates of decline will be lower because the exist-
ing social norm is still strongly in favor of cutting. This would explain 
why in the hard cases, particularly in the Horn of Africa, prevalence 
rates remain extremely high compared with the minority who still cir-
cumcise in Senegal. And why where prevalence is lower elimination 
appears to be happening faster. Tostan’s model has helped shift the 
norm by ensuring the involvement of local women at every stage, cre-
ating more and more advocates for abandonment who thereby spread 
the message and constitute visible evidence of an increasingly legiti-
mate alternative norm. 
 This systematic and sustainable basis for change seems more likely 
to succeed than the more instrumental approach of Waris Dirie’s 
Desert Flower Foundation which, under the title “Save a Little Desert 
Flower,” agrees a contract with parents and provides fi nancial sup-
port in return for not circumcising their daughters. 87 Not tackling 
 http:// fr.tostan.org/ news/ les- contributions- de- tostan- vers- l’abandon- de- 
lexcision- soulignées- par- le- gouvernement- du (accessed July 12, 2016), and the 
interview at: Melinda Gates, “Melinda Gates: 5 Questions for Tostan’s Molly 
Melching,”  Impatient Optimists , Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, June 25, 
2013,  www.impatientoptimists.org/ Posts/ 2013/ 06/ Melinda- Gates- 5- Questions- 
for- Tostans- Molly- Melching#.VZkWGngk_ dl (accessed July 12, 2016). 
 86  Lucy Walker, Personal Communication, The Orchid Project, May 1, 2015. 
 87  “Our Achievements,” Desert Flower,  http:// retteeinekleinewuestenblume.de/ en/ 
our- achievements.html (accessed July 12, 2016). 
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the social acceptance/ marriage prospects issue collectively via com-
munity engagement is even less likely to work where prevalence is 
so high (e.g., 93 percent in Djibouti in 2013 according to UNICEF). 
Unsurprisingly, the families who sign contracts come under intense 
social pressure from their non- contracted neighbors who represent 
the dominant social norm. The mother of Safa, a Djibouti girl who 
acted as the young Dirie in a movie of her life called  Desert Flower , 
expresses some regret for this very reason:
 My husband and I signed this contract where we guaranteed not to have 
Safa circumcised. But to be honest I am not convinced that it was the right 
decision. The circumcision ritual is part of our tradition. We will never fi nd 
a husband for Safa if she is not circumcised. She will never belong to our 
society like the other girls. So I am sure that one day we will have her cir-
cumcised anyway. 88 
 To st an- style education programs, and the provision of better informa-
tion about the impact of circumcision and alternative choices (not to 
circumcise, or to circumcise less invasively), are explicitly designed to 
avoid this dilemma. They seem as light- touch a form of paternalism as 
one could envisage but in being based on a rejection of existing consent 
(that is, the status quo: consent to carry on the practice), they qualify 
as a form of soft paternalism. The efforts made to change choices, 
and shape the self- identity of the choosers, are part of a sophisticated 
project designed to change lives. They are not openly coercive, nor 
based on a deception, and they encourage dialogue, discussion, and 
a non- judgmental approach. But these forms of soft paternalism are 
justifi ed by the lack of valid consent and they are not about to take no 
for an ans w er. 
 There is, of course, a paradox in doing nothing: Keeping the exist-
ence of a different option from women who cut their daughters might 
be seen to be just as paternalistic as intervening. Does the provision 
of information designed to change the status quo constitute paternal-
ism, rather than a leveling up of the scales (against years of paren-
tal paternalism)? It is proactive  – those who don’t self- identify as 
having a problem are now told something they see as legitimate is 
 88  This quotation comes from a fascinating and thoughtful account by Waris 
Dirie of her interactions with Safa’s family in an extract from her book  Saving 
Safa . Extract from  The Weekend Australian , June 27, 2015, 28. 
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indeed a problem. Dworkin’s original defi nition was about interfer-
ence with a person’s “liberty of action” (echoing Mill). But isn’t com-
munity empowerment even more invasive than that? In the name of 
moral advance, it is problematizing an existing way of life without 
any request to do so. This is the true power of the Human Rights lan-
guage – by claiming a universal solidarity it claims anyone’s problems 
are everyone’s problems, thereby legitimating unsolicited intervention. 
Even light- touch paternalism has traces of the claim to moral superior-
ity built into it. In other words, any engagement in the lives of others 
that they would not necessarily choose for themselves as they are con-
stitutes a form of paternalistic interventionism, however soft, in the 
name of the person they could become. Why should it be so diffi cult 
to acknowledge this as a legitimate demand for moral change that is 
obviously paternalistic? 
 Unless we see tribal and village life as hermetically sealed, with the 
tribe or village having a kind of transcendent ontological reality linked 
to a moral monopoly, is there a reason to privilege  what is in favor of 
 what could be ? Cultural relativists and some conservatives would say 
yes against the emphatic no of liberals. To defend existing culture on 
principle requires an argument for why it should be protected and that 
opens up a discussion about what appropriate norms ought to be. In 
other words, cultural relativists would need to argue for the universal 
principle of “leaving other cultures alone regardless of their substan-
tive social norms” thereby conceding the point that whether or not 
other cultures should be left alone must be the result of a moral discus-
sion about how people ought to be treated. To refuse this conversation 
is just to absent yourself from it rather than to prevent it from happen-
ing (much less win it). It opens up the space in principle for universal, 
agreed norms. If all parties can engage in this discussion, as we have 
seen women in Tostan programs in Senegal do on more or less equal 
terms, then there is a kind of consent at work even if, in the absence of 
soft paternalism, such an option would likely never have been chosen. 
 And this consent is the prize because it effaces the moral drive that 
lies behind intervention and will not be denied. In this way, the simi-
larities with the colonial practice of moral crusades against the cul-
tural life of colonized peoples, especially women, can be disguised. 
There’s no harm in the truth: anti- FGM/ C missionaries in the 1920s 
in Sudan and Kenya would have seen many of these issues in exactly 
the same terms as we do today. In this way we understand that empire 
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wasn’t a phase so much as a structural relation that is always with 
us where the dominant seek to discipline, and even eliminate, “the 
other” in their midst. All that has changed is that we call missionaries 
and district offi cers “human rights and development activists” today. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the scope of paternalism goes much deeper 
than mere behavioral change, into subjectivity and identity itself. I n 
other words, soft paternalism of the producing consent variety may 
have more far- reaching long- term effects than hard paternalism which 
seeks no more than a change in behav i o r. 
 F GM/ C and the Subject of Human Rights 
 Evidence from many African countries suggests persistent support 
among many women for FGM/ C’s continuation as well as examples 
where a majority of men are opposed to the practice. 89 Circumcision 
is often celebrated as an essential social ritual for girls and a proud 
day for parents and extended families. 90 Testimony from some of the 
women who support abandonment, including midwives, show a vari-
ety of motivations including health consequences, religious beliefs, 
and human rights concerns. And most recognize that the community 
as a whole has to change for the norm to shift. 91 These cases show 
the importance of sensitive and supportive conversations with oth-
ers in a shared language for creating the momentum for change. This 
is tougher to do in harder cases where a large majority still circum-
cises. Underlying the broader elimination campaign, therefore, is also 
a drive to liberate liberal subjects from their cultural prisons, a classic 
colonial urge. 
 The liberal subject (leaving aside the assumption that the universal 
gender of the subject is male) is well described by John Rawls: “the self 
is prior to the ends which are affi rmed by it; even a dominant end must 
be chosen from among numerous possibilities.” He goes on:
 89  There are several cases where more boys and men than girls and women want 
FGM/ C to be eliminated (in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Chad, for example). 
In Cameroon, 85 percent of boys and men surveyed thought FGM/ C should 
stop: UNICEF, “Female Genital Mutilation/ Cutting,” 62. 
 90  Gruenbaum,  The Female Circumcision Controversy , ch. 2. 
 91  “Meeting with ‘Social Norms Entrepreneurs,’ ”  The Orchid Project blog , May 
15, 2015,  http:// orchidproject.org/ meeting- with- social- norms- entrepreneurs/  
(accessed July 12, 2016). 
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 a moral person is a subject with ends he has chosen, and his fundamental 
preference is for conditions that enable him to frame a mode of life that 
expresses his nature as a free and equal rational being as fully as circum-
stances permit. 92 
 O r, in the words of Marie Bassili Assaad, the head of an Egyptian 
taskforce on FGM/ C whose 1980 report on Egypt was highly infl uen-
tial: “A woman’s view of herself and her belief in old customs change 
in response to information, education, and social and economic oppor-
tunities. Educated women see that their status may be derived from 
roles other than those of wife and mother.” 93 Contra Fo ucault, there is 
in these cases a self- conscious liberal subject with a pre- existing nature 
who freely chooses her own way of being human. For liberal paternal-
ists it is this moral person whose interests must be represented. For 
Foucault, in contrast, such a narrow conception of what it means to be 
human – the individual liberal subject – closes off other as- yet undis-
covered or tightly patrolled alternative ways in which one might be 
human. 94 Judith Butler extends this analysis by looking at the ways in 
which even some feminist theory assumes “women” exist as a natural 
subject needing representation. She argues that the legal and norma-
tive regimes which claim to represent “women’s interests” are as much 
producers of the category “women” as representatives of it as a pre- 
formed, pre- social entity. 95 In other words, the formation of liberal 
subjects closes off as many options as it opens, and in particular it 
creates a certain kind of individual whose agency becomes about real-
izing her own interests and choosing her own identi ty. 
 We can see this in relation to conceptions of femininity, mater-
nity, and sexuality. The control of female sexuality has been cited as 
a feature of many local justifi cations for FGM/ C and several studies 
make note of it. 96 As the World Bank put it in 1994, its aim was to 
 92  John Rawls,  A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1971), 560, 561. 
 93  Marie Bassili  Assaad , “ Female Circumcision in Egypt: Social Implications, 
Current Research, and Prospects for Change ,”  Studies in Family Planning  11 ,  1 
( 1980 ):  6 . 
 94  See  Ben  Golder , “ Foucault and the Unfi nished Human of Rights ,”  Law, Culture 
and the Humanities  6 ( 2010 ). 
 95  Judith  Butler ,  Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity ( London : 
 Routledge ,  2006 ), ch. 1. 
 96  See the survey carried out by an affi liate of the IAC, the National Committee 
on Traditional Practices in Ethiopia;  Awaken 2, 2 (1998): 8. And also  Amel 
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challenge “the social attitudes and beliefs that undergird male violence 
and  renegotiating the meaning of gender and sexuality and the bal-
ance of power between men and women at all levels of society.” 97 Or, 
in USAID’s words:  “The ultimate desired outcome of FGM/ C pro-
jects is to eradicate the practice, to preserve women’s bodies, and to 
empower them to make better choices regarding their sexuality and 
reproduction.” 98 
 Critical to this freeing of the liberal subject is preventing her natu-
ral self from being damaged in some permanent way by ritual. This 
includes not just threats to her life from FGM/ C but also to her “nor-
mal” (that is, “natural”) appearance and sexual functioning. Waris 
Dirie’s foundation has even paid for reconstructive surgery for some 
infi bulated women. As a Masai woman called Ntailan Lolkoki told an 
interviewer after the surgery: “I looked wonderful all of a sudden. As a 
kid you start to explore your sexuality but circumcision stopped that. 
After the surgery those feelings were restored. I would lie in my bed 
and I could feel everything. My neighbours could tell I had this sexu-
ality.” 99 Another woman, twenty- year- old Idriss, says: “After surgery 
I felt complete as a woman.” 100 
 Bu t these views of normalness and naturalness, of femininity and 
sexuality, are not universal. In her work on the Hofriyat in Sudan, 
Janice Boddy argues that:
 Fahmy ,  Mawaheb T.  El- Mouelhy , and  Ahmed R.  Ragab , “ Female Genital 
Mutilation/ Cutting and Issues of Sexuality in Egypt ,”  Reproductive Health 
Matters  18 ,  36 ( 2010 ):  184 . 
  97  Lori L.  Heise ,  Jacqueline  Pitanguy , and  Adrienne  Germain ,  Violence Against 
Women: The Hidden Health Burden ( Washington, DC :  The World Bank , 
 1994 ), my italics. 
  98  Toubia,  Program Guidelines  for Integrating Activities to Eradicate Female 
Genital Mutilation , 24. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid 
Ra’ad Al Hussein, says, in advocating for girls’ education: “In addition to 
academic achievements, education must equip students with the tools to 
critically analyse and challenge rigid gender roles that limit choices and 
perpetuate women’s subordination.” “Girls’ Education Key to Eliminating 
Discrimination,” United Nations Human Rights, June 22, 2015,  www.ohchr.
org/ EN/ NewsEvents/ Pages/ GirlsEducation.aspx (accessed July 12, 2016). 
  99  This led to some unwanted attention from some of the men around her as 
she recounts in the article. Rosamund Urwin, “Waris Dirie: The Supermodel 
Giving FGM Victims Their Sexuality Back,”  Evening Standard , July 1, 2015, 
 www.standard.co.uk/ lifestyle/ london- life/ waris- dirie- the- supermodel- giving- 
fgm- victims- their- sexuality- back- 10357560.html (accessed July 12, 2016). 
 100  Ibid . 
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 By removing their external genitalia, female Hofriyati seek not to diminish 
their own sexual pleasure – though this is an obvious effect – so much as 
to enhance their femininity. Pharaonic circumcision is a symbolic act which 
brings sharply into focus the fertility potential of women by dramatically 
deemphasizing their sexuality. 
 Later, she adds:  “Village women do not achieve social recognition 
by behaving or becoming like men, but by becoming less like men, 
physically, sexually, and socially.” 101 Anthropologist Ellen Gruenbaum 
recalls a conversation with a neighbor in Sudan who asked if women 
in the United States were infi bulated:
 I told her, “No, we leave women ‘natural,’ with no circumcision at all.” She 
paused thoughtfully before her reply: “This is ‘natural’ for us.” 102 
 Other anthropological accounts record the amusement of women who 
have been circumcised at the appearance of uncircumcised Western 
women, as well as discussions of whether or not FGM/ C prevents 
women from experiencing sexual pleasure. Gruenbaum queries this 
conclusion on the grounds that simply focusing on sex demeans the 
importance of sensuality and love and ignores any psychological fac-
tors that may be present and inhibiting female enjoyment of sex, but 
also that the data on sexual response post- FGM/ C is ambiguous. 103 
Melissa Parker goes even further arguing that:
 The apparent need for many people in the West to make sense of themselves 
in terms that emphasise particular aspects of their sexuality, and to require 
particular kinds of sexual gratifi cation for their well- being, is not, of course, 
universal. In other parts of the world, and indeed for some people in the 
West, such ideas seem immoral, amoral or bizarre. 104 
 101  Janice Boddy,  Wombs and Alien Spirits: Women, Men, and the Zar Cult in 
the Northern Sudan (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 55, 56 
(Hofriyat is a pseudonym used by Boddy). Boddy argues that biological sex – 
as evident in the genitalia of babies – is an ambiguous indicator of a child’s 
future gender identity which, for the Hofriyati, is a matter of socialization 
over subsequent years. As a result: “Genital surgery accomplishes the social 
defi nition of a child’s sex,” for both boys and girls.  Ibid . , 58. 
 102  Gruenbaum,  The Female Circumcision Controversy , 68. 
 103  Ibid . , 132, 144, and ch. 5,  passim . See also Bell, “Genital Cutting and Western 
Discourses on Sexuality,” 138. 
 104  Melissa  Parker , “ Rethinking Female Circumcision ,”  Africa  65 ,  4 ( 1995 ):  520 . 
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 U nderlying elimination efforts is a conception of the liberal subject 
that refl ects widely held views about the civilizational progressiveness 
of Western women as Mohanty has argued (referring to the view some 
Western feminists hold of Third World women):
 This average third- world woman leads an essentially truncated life based on 
her feminine gender (read:  sexually constrained) and being “third world” 
(read:  ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition- bound, religious, domesti-
cated, family- oriented, victimized, etc.). This, I suggest, is in contrast to the 
(implicit) self- representation of western women as educated, modern, as 
having control over their own bodies and sexualities, and the “freedom” to 
make their own decisions. 105 
 This view of poor women isn’t restricted to the Third World. In her 
account of “professional middle- class maternity” in Britain, where 
she argues a neoliberal form of feminism is establishing itself, Angela 
McRobbie describes successful women as either stage- managers of 
the “family fi nancial unit” and successful professionals in their own 
right, or as slim and youthful mothers whose lives revolve around 
“routines of play dates, coffee shops and jogging buggies.” This 
conception of modernity eschews feminism’s social democratic her-
itage and reinstates “new norms of middle- class hegemony against 
which less advantaged families can only feel themselves to be inferior 
or inadequate or else judging themselves as having not tried hard 
enough.” 106 This conception of empowered maternity and femininity, 
consistent with the subject at the core of human rights, puts a high 
premium on autonomous individual choices. This is what allows 
FGM/ C to be categorized as the crime of child abuse (i.e., bad or 
“non- maternal” mothering) and justifi es a child being protected 
from her mother and other female relatives until she is old enough 
to make an informed choice for herself. In some ways this is the least 
visible but most important impact of paternalism. But the full pano-
ply of neoliberal choices is not available, of course, to young girls 
in FGM/ C- practicing societies; FGM/ C is just one part of their lives 
along with many poverty- related concerns like lack of education and 
health c are. 
 105  Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes.” 
 106  Angela  McRobbie , “ Feminism, the Family and the New ‘Mediated’ 
Maternalism ,”  New Formations  80– 81 ( 2013 ). 
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 C onclusion 
 In the campaign against FGM/ C, I’ve argued, paternalism is an ever 
present. It’s obviously there in relation to children, and it’s present in 
a clash between parents and elimination advocates who would use 
the criminal law to stop it. But even the most sensitive strategies of 
the FGM/ C movement reject the notion that the status quo of ongo-
ing consent is legitimate. This  consent is not genuine largely because 
of a combination of a set of existing patriarchal norms that disguise 
women’s true interests and a lack of adequate information about alter-
natives. Choices are not being made in a defensible way. Soft paternal-
ists  rely on this lack of genuine consent for justifi cation, but they also 
shape the making of choices in far more subtle ways than hard pater-
nalists. In the end, this more subtle persuasion operates at a deeper 
level of paternalism, having radical effects on FGM/ C- practicing com-
munities and on the self- identities of the girls who grow up in them. 
Whether paternalism is justifi ed through moral or welfare concerns, 
the scale of this involvement in the lives of others regardless of their 
own professed desires surely constitutes a powerful form of paternal 
action. 
 In conclusion I want to make four further points. The fi rst is about 
the nature of the conversation. We can see structural power (“empire”) 
at work in the fact that African women do not get to problematize and 
challenge Western norms about, for example, child raising. Paternalism 
is a top- down social practice. The women Tostan deals with don’t get 
to come to London or New York and start a discussion about Western 
norms of gender, sexuality, and appropriate ways to treat children. If 
they did, what might they say about intensely competitive education 
(and the depression to which it increasingly leads), boarding schools, 
lack of play and risk appreciation, medication of behavior, over- 
protectiveness, lack of social responsibility, greed, poor consumption 
habits, obesity, weak impulse control, addiction to technology, sexuali-
zation of children and so on. They might accuse children in the West of 
being infantilized well into adulthood, overly entitled and anti- social 
and lacking in proper respect for their elders, rather than prepared for 
their adult lives by their parents within a functioning community. 
 This leads to the second point. Culture and community are often 
portrayed as playing a negative role in the case of FGM/ C. In the 
words of Nahid Toubia:
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 The fear of losing the psychological, moral and material benefi ts of “belong-
ing” is one of the greatest motivators of conformity. When the demands 
of conformity confl ict with rationality or individual need, denial intervenes 
as a mechanism for survival. In this way, many women justify their own 
oppression. 107 
 Safa’s mother, quoted above, put this succinctly: “She will never belong 
to our society like the other girls.” But we have seen the vital impor-
tance of community involvement in social change. In some ways, the 
authority of the community makes normative change easier. In the case 
of the United Kingdom, for example, changing a norm about appropri-
ate civility in public life would require legal change and persuasion of 
each individual, in a sense, to abide by collective expectations. In the 
case of Senegal, in contrast, the community shifts the norm of accept-
ability and everyone, feeling the weight of community membership, 
follows. For many the lack of community support is exactly one of 
the ills of modern life. Hillary Clinton’s 1996 book  It Takes a Village 
was an attempt to argue that raising children in America was a social 
responsibility. 108 “It takes a village (to raise a child)” was said to be an 
African proverb. 
 But can modernity realize the vision of liberal subjects without dis-
assembling the village? Is FGM/ C a ritual that precisely consolidates 
the sense of shared identity and destiny that makes a village, a com-
munity, strong? In this sense, it is about high entry and exit costs. 
If you are circumcised then you are committed in a deep sense to 
remain amongst others who both share and understand the practice. 
The village keeps its young people and the families – and the fam-
ily economy here is pivotal to survival – ensure its reproduction. In 
many ways, the liberal subject is fashioned to leave the village, to take 
her labor power and turn it into capital somewhere else for someone 
else’s benefi t rather than that of her relatives. She can see herself as a 
free agent, unencumbered by permanent identity and able to choose 
any sense of femininity and sexuality for herself. Are we so sure we 
are right that this is progress on the metric of human happiness if 
we measure it by a sense of security and belonging? This is not to 
 107  Toubia,  Female Genital Mutilation , 37. 
 108  Hillary Rodham  Clinton ,  It Takes a Village, And Other Lessons Children 
Teach Us ( New York :  Simon & Schuster ,  1996 ). 
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defend FGM/ C. If the Tostan model could be effective throughout 
Africa it would seem to be a net gain on any metric one might care to 
specify – what’s right, what’s good, harm to others, longevity, quality 
of life. It’s hard to see what argument can be made against it beyond 
“it is tradition” which only opens up the debate about why any given 
tradition should (or should not) persist. But it is to ask what function 
such rituals play in community life, and what is lost as well as gained 
by eliminating them. 
 T his leads to the third point: What  responsibility goes along with 
pushing for radical cultural change? Does creating liberal subjects cre-
ate a responsibility for making a liberal society to go with them? The 
women we have been hearing about are often living in conditions of 
great material scarcity and environmental vulnerability. They remain 
responsible for the long- term life prospects their daughters enjoy 
once the anti- FGM/ C movement’s gaze moves on. For many FGM/ 
C- practicing communities, the imminent threat to life and health are
greater from other causes – disease, violence, hunger – than from the
negative consequences of FGM/ C. As a result, seeing FGM/ C within its
“socioeconomic, political and cultural context” is essential. 109
 If we intervene in this signifi cant way, do we not then take on a 
responsibility to see the job through? If we stop a parent abusing 
a child, if we create estrangement by educating the rising generation 
in a way that clashes with the values of their parents, if we introduce 
new consumption patterns, do we not retain some ongoing responsi-
bility for the consequences? Surely this must be part of the paternal-
istic discussion? Is it really enough to undertake our experiment and 
then get back on the plane? When the rights of African girls are said 
to be our mission, then the fact they may be malnourished matters as 
much to them, as it should to us, as the fact that they face FGM/ C. If 
we assume FGM/ C is our responsibility, we should be asking what else 
will improve the life chances of the child concerned: health, education, 
work? Moreover, are we not obligated to address squarely the con-
tradictions in our position? Isn’t it the rights of children that concern 
us? In which case, all forms of physical interference with the genitalia 
 109  Obioma  Nnaemeka and  Joy Ngozi  Ezeilo , “ Context(ure)s of Human Rights – 
Local Realities, Global Contexts ,” in  Engendering Human Rights: Cultural 
and Socioeconomic Realities in Africa , eds.  Obioma  Nnaemeka and  Joy Ngozi 
 Ezeilo ( London :  Palgrave Macmillan ,  2005 ),  5 . 
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of young children at whatever age should be part of the conversation, 
including male circumcisi on. 110 
 Finally, the children themselves are almost entirely absent from this 
story. They are in Tostan’s model:  there is a separate track for ado-
lescents separate from their parents although these are older children 
than the age at which circumcision takes place. But in general the voice 
of the child isn’t heard on either side. For the parents, the child is 
not a liberal subject with rights against them but integrally part of 
“the family economy” and thus like all family members she has a role, 
obligations, and expectations placed on her that are defi ned in large 
part by the family’s needs. For interveners, many of these children 
would choose circumcision given that their mothers and grandmoth-
ers, sisters and friends are all circumcised (and their brothers, there 
being few examples where male circumcision doesn’t go along with 
female circumcision). The social implications of such a change in fam-
ily dynamics, especially in poor, rural societies, are profound. If young 
people, for example, do not remain to tend the elderly, where will a 
social safety net come from? The state? Western aid agencies? And do 
children have a strong voice in our own societies? They certainly lack 
many of the formal mechanisms by which to represent their own inter-
ests (to vote, to appear in their own rights before the law, to marry, to 
have sex). These are all areas where we silence them but is it “for their 
own good” or ours? The very least we can do in eliminating FGM/ C 
is take a hard look at our own attitudes and practices toward children 
and refl ect on the many hypocrisies which mark the supposedly more 
developed and civilized societies of the We st. 
 110  Schweder, “Symposium on German Court Ruling on Circumcision”; Bell, 
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